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This paper defines de-industrialization as a secular decline in the share of manufacturing in 
national employment. De-industrialization, in this sense, has been a universal feature of economic 
growth in advanced economies in recent decades. The paper considers briefly what explains this 
development and quantifies some of the factors responsible. It then examines the experience of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, which are two countries that have combined rapid de-
industrialization with a strong overall economic performance. The paper considers both the 
domestic situation of manufacturing industry in these countries and its foreign trade performance, 
and examines in detail the United Kingdom balance of payments, and documenting how 
improvements in the non-manufacturing sphere have helped offset a worsening performance in 
manufacturing trade. It concludes that manufacturing still matters to economic performance even 
at the highest levels of economic development, and that ￿premature de-industrialization￿ could 





In the course of economic development virtually all countries follow a broadly similar trajectory. As 
development gets under way, the share of agriculture in national employment falls and there is a rapid 
increase in the share of manufacturing. This process is known as ￿industrialization￿. At a certain point, 
however, the share of manufacturing stabilizes and then starts to fall back again. There is a 
corresponding increase in the share of services in national employment. By analogy with the preceding 
phase, this process is often described as ￿de-industrialization￿. Note that we are talking here about 
relative shares. If total employment is growing fast enough, then the share of manufacturing may 
decline rapidly even though the absolute number of people working in this sector is actually rising.  
This has been the situation in Spain in recent years. Note also that employment is not the same thing as 
production. In many advanced economies, manufacturing productivity is increasing rapidly with the 
result that this sector is producing more output with fewer workers. Thus, de-industrialization in 
employment terms does not imply falling production.  
 
Chart 1 provides some information about the manufacturing sector in Western Europe and North 
America. There has been a dramatic fall in the share of this sector in national employment in all of the 
countries shown. This decline is still continuing in most of them, although there are a few exceptions, 
notably Canada and Italy, where the manufacturing share has now stabilized, for the time being at 
least. As can be seen from chart 2, the employment share of manufacturing has also been falling 
rapidly in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. These Asian 
countries are now facing the same problems and uncertainties that have been confronting Europe and 
the United States for decades.  
                                                 
1 This is an expanded version of a paper by Robert Rowthorn at an International Conference on   
￿De-industrialisation and Industrial Re-structuring￿ on 5 December 2003 at the Renaissance Seoul Hotel, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea. The authors are grateful to Alicia Rapin of UNCTAD for providing in convenient form most 
of the data used for the regression analysis and some of the charts, and to Andrew Glynn for helpful comments 































Sources:  OECD Labour Force Statistics supplemented by the ILO Database on Labour Statistics and the Statistical Yearbook of 
the Republic of China (Taiwan Province of China), various issues.
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Sources:  See chart 1. 
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The causes and significance of de-industrialization have been debated with fluctuating intensity since 
the process first began. Some commentators regard declining manufacturing employment as a 
symptom of economic failure and a harbinger of impending impoverishment. For them the primary 
objective of public policy should be to halt or reverse this process. Others regard declining 
manufacturing employment as a normal feature of economic growth in advanced economies. They see 
it as an inevitable feature of structural change that may create serious problems in the short and 
medium run, but is potentially beneficial in the longer run. For these commentators, the primary aim 
of public policy should be to facilitate change and smooth the transition to a new economic structure. 
In reality, the choice is never quite as stark as this and most commentators take an intermediate 
position. They recognize the inevitability and potential benefits of structural change, but they also 
recognize that some of the developments in manufacturing may be both undesirable and avoidable. 
These developments may reflect the failings of specific industries or firms that would have a viable 
future if their failings could be overcome.
2  
 
A variety of reasons have been put forward to explain why the employment share of manufacturing 
should fall in advanced economies.  These include the following: 
 
1) Specialization. Certain activities such as design, catering and transport that were previously 
performed in-house by manufacturing firms are increasingly performed by specialist service 
providers. This represents a re-classification rather than a genuine shrinkage in the 
manufacturing sector. A wide definition of the manufacturing sector would include all of the 
service inputs that are embodied in the final output of this sector. If this were done, the 
manufacturing sector would appear larger than it is in official statistics, and employment in 
this broadly defined sector would have declined less than these statistics imply. Thus, part of 
the decline in manufacturing employment may be merely a statistical artefact caused by 
shifting classification. However, it seems implausible that this accounts for more than a 
modest fraction of the huge recorded fall in the share of manufacturing employment in 
advanced economies over the past thirty years.  
 
2) Consumption. As incomes rise in poor countries during the course of industrialization, the 
proportion of expenditure devoted to food declines, and consumers purchase more 
manufactured goods. This is known as Engel￿s Law. The sociologist Daniel Bell (1976) in his 
theory of post-industrial society predicted that the pattern of consumer demand would 
eventually shift away from manufactures towards services. The evidence for ￿Bell￿s Law￿, as 
it might be called, is mixed. It is true that the share of monetary income spent on 
manufactured goods is now falling. However, this is not because the real quantity of 
manufactured goods consumed in advanced economies is stagnating. On the contrary, as 
everyone knows from personal experience, the amount of electronic and mechanical goods 
consumed by the average citizen of these countries is mushrooming. The falling share of 
monetary income spent on such goods is not due to the saturation of demand for manufactures, 
as Bell￿s Law would imply. What it reflects is a rapid fall in the relative price of 
manufactures. Rising imports from low wage countries, together with rising productivity at 
home, mean that manufactured goods in the advanced economies are now so cheap that 
consumers can buy a lot more of these goods whilst spending a smaller fraction of their 
income on them. 
 
                                                 
2 See Rowthorn and Wells (1987) for an extensive discussion of this and related issues.   
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3) Productivity. By definition, the growth rate of labour productivity is equal to the growth 
rate of output minus the growth rate of employment. Thus, if output in two sectors is 
increasing at the same rate, the sector with the faster productivity growth will have the slower 
employment growth and vice versa. The employment share of the most dynamic sector will 
decline. This is simply a matter of arithmetic. Conventional statistics indicate that, on average, 
the real output of manufactured goods in the advanced economies has risen at about the same 
rate as the real output of services over the past thirty years. These statistics also indicate that in 
most countries the growth rate of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector has been 
much faster than in services. Thus, to maintain its share of real output, the manufacturing 
sector has required a decreasing share of total employment, whilst to achieve the same result, 
the service sector has required an increasing share of employment. To keep up with the more 
dynamic manufacturing sector, the service sector has absorbed an ever-increasing share of 
total employment, which it has acquired at the expense of manufacturing.
3 This arithmetic 
suggests that the relative decline of manufacturing employment has been mainly the result of 
rapid productivity growth in this sector. In a recent paper on the United States, Triplett and 
Bosworth (2003) show that productivity growth in the service sector has accelerated markedly 
over the past decade. However, manufacturing industry has experienced a similar acceleration, 




4) International trade. International trade affects manufacturing employment in a variety of 
ways. It may increase productivity in this sector by stimulating competition and encouraging 
domestic firms to produce more efficiently. Competition from imports may also increase 
productivity by eliminating low value-added activities or inefficient firms. To pay for imports 
a country may export goods and services to foreigners, it may use its income from investments 
abroad, or it may borrow. These responses have diverse implications for the domestic 
manufacturing sector, which are beyond the scope of this paper to explore. However, a few 
comments about trade with low-wage countries are in order.  
 
To the extent that manufactured imports from low-wage countries are financed by the export 
of manufactured goods from the advanced economies this will generate new manufacturing 
jobs in the exporting countries. For example, in return for clothes from China the advanced 
economies may export sophisticated equipment. This exchange will eliminate jobs in the 
clothing industry of the advanced economies but create new jobs in the equipment industries. 
However, the number of jobs lost in the low value-added clothing sector will be much greater 
than the new jobs created in the high value-added equipment industries.
5 As a result, there will 
be a net loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector as a whole. 
 
                                                 
3 This argument was first advanced systematically by Baumol (1967) and Fuchs (1968) and was developed at 
length in Baumol, Blackman and Wolff (1989). 
4 Table 1 of Triplett and Bosworth (2003) indicates that the annual growth rate of labour productivity in 27 
service industries (employment weighted) was on average 1.5 per cent over the period 1987￿1995 and 2.6 per 
cent over the period 1995￿2000. According to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, statistics for output 
per worker hour, manufacturing productivity grew by 2.9 per cent and 4.0 per cent per year respectively. Thus, 
in each period manufacturing productivity growth was around 1.3 per cent a year faster in manufacturing. 
5 This point is explored at length below.  
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5) Investment. The above discussion describes the evolution of the manufacturing sector under 
the impact of rising incomes, differential productivity growth, relative price changes, and 
foreign trade. Superimposed on this evolution is the influence of other factors such as the 
share of fixed investment in total spending. Investment expenditure is skewed towards 
manufactured goods, such as machinery and building materials, so that a higher rate of 
investment will increase the share of manufactured goods in total demand, and thereby raise 




In an article written for the IMF a few years ago, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy sought to quantify some 
of the above effects (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999). Between 1970 and 1994 the employment 
share of manufacturing in the advanced economies as a whole fell by 8.7 percentage points. They 
estimated that about four fifths of this decline was due to internal factors such as productivity growth 
and changing expenditure patterns, and about one fifth to trade with low wage economies.  They also 
estimated that for every 4.4 manufacturing jobs that were lost thorough competition from low-wage 
imports, there was on average one new manufacturing job created through the export of more 
sophisticated manufactured goods (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1999).  
 
The above estimates are now quite old and may have been overtaken by events, such as the growth of 
imports from China. We have therefore extended and updated the econometric analysis of Rowthorn 
and Ramaswamy. The previous study covered a panel of 18 industrial countries over the period   
1964￿1994, whereas this analysis covers 23 countries over the period 1963￿2002. The additional 
countries are Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. 
There are also other differences. A more convenient functional form is used here to express the 
relationship between manufacturing employment and other variables, and some variables are measured 
differently. Additional variables are also introduced. However, these are mostly minor changes and the 
findings of this analysis are similar to those of the previous study.  
 
The regression analysis is based on equations of the following form, where EMPSHARE is the share 
of manufacturing in civil employment, Y is per capita income and the Zi are other variables. The latter 
include dummy variables for individual countries to correct for international differences in 
measurement practices and other unexplained ￿fixed￿ effects. There are also specific dummies for 
Germany to allow for the impact of reunification in 1990 and subsequent adjustment. To capture the 
influence of international trade on economic structure, there are two variables, TRADEBAL and 
LDCIMP that were used in the previous study. The former is the overall trade balance in manufactured 
goods (total exports minus total imports); the latter is equal to manufactured imports from developing 
countries. There are also two new trade variables: OPEN and IMPCHINA. The former is equal to 
manufactured exports plus imports; the latter is equal to manufactured imports from China. All trade 
variables are expressed as a percentage of GDP measured in United States dollars at current market 
prices. 
 
The purpose of TRADEBAL is to capture the effect of overall manufacturing trade performance on 
the structure of employment. The variable OPEN is included to see whether greater openness to 
foreign trade leads to higher labour productivity, and hence less employment, in the manufacturing 
error Z a Y a Y a a EMPSHARE
i
i i e e + + + + = ∑
>2
2
2 1 0 ) (log log 
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sector. The variable LDCIMP is designed to capture the effects of competition from low-wage 
countries on manufacturing employment in the advanced economies. These effects include increased 
efficiency in activities that compete directly with low-wage producers, together with shifts in the 
composition of manufacturing towards higher value-added, skill-intensive or capital-intensive 
activities. The variable IMPCHINA is included to see whether the low-wage effect is greater for 
imports from China than from other low-wage economies. 
 
Finally, there is the variable FIXCAP, which is gross domestic fixed capital formation expressed as a 
per cent of GDP at current market prices. The rationale for using this variable is that capital 
investment is manufacturing intensive, and a change in the rate of investment should therefore have a 
greater impact on the demand for manufactured goods than on the demand for other types of output. 
 
Table 1 reports the econometric results using pooled data from all countries in the sample over the 
whole time period. There is strong evidence of a hump-shaped relationship between manufacturing 
employment and per capita income. The employment share of manufacturing rises in the earlier stages 
of economic development and falls back at high levels of per capita income. The estimated turning 
point is around US$9,500 (1995 PPP) per capita which most OECD countries had reached by 1970 
and some well before. A number of the more advanced East Asian economies have now surpassed this 
point and the share of manufacturing employment has been falling in these countries for some years 
(chart 2).  
 
As expected, fixed capital formation exerts a positive influence on manufacturing employment. There 
is also evidence that the overall trade balance in manufactures has a significant impact on 
manufacturing employment. The coefficient of TRADEBAL is positive and statistically significant in 
most equations, suggesting that countries with a large trade surplus in manufactures tend to have a 
larger than average manufacturing sector. The magnitude of this coefficient is consistent with the 
results obtained in the previous IMF study. The coefficient of OPEN is negative and significant in 
most equations, suggesting that more open economies have higher productivity, and therefore less 
employment, in manufacturing. 
 
The coefficient of LDCIMP is negative in all equations and is mostly significant. The coefficient of 
IMPCHINA is positive and implausibly large in equations (3) and (5), but negative and significant 
when first differences are used in equation (6). Taking these findings as a whole, the estimates support 
the view that imports from low-wage economies impact negatively on manufacturing employment in 
the industrial countries. However, it is not clear to what extent this impact is greater than average in 
the case of imports from China. 
 
Accounting for de-industrialization 
 
This section uses the regression results shown in table 1 to quantify the influence of various factors 
that have contributed to de-industrialization over the past decade (1992￿2002). The table contains a 
number of equations, so there is a question as to which is the most appropriate. After examining the 
residuals, equation (4) seems to yield the best fit for recent years. It also has plausible coefficients. The 
decomposition that follows is therefore based on this equation. Another equation could also have been 





Estimates of the share of manufacturing in employment, 1962￿2002 
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Country  dummies  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
R
2  .495 .850 .853 .859 .860 .120 
Turning  Point  $9,841 $8,842 $8,898 $9,410 $9,374  $10,388 
N-S balanced trade ratio  .55 6.9  11.8  5.7 8.5 4.9 
        
Sources:  Regression analysis uses trade data from the UNCTAD database, employment shares from OECD Labour Force 
Statistics supplemented by the ILO database on labour statistics and the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan Province of China); per capita income and investment data from the OECD National Accounts. 
Notes:  ￿**￿ (￿*￿) denote significance at the 1 per cent (5 per cent) level; absolute t-values are shown in brackets; 
constant terms are omitted for clarity. All regressions are based on a sample consisting of the following 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United 
States, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. Variables are defined as follows: 
  EMPSHARE = percentage share of manufacturing in civil employment. Y = GDP per capita in 1995 United 
States dollars at PPP. TRADEBAL = manufactured exports ￿ manufactured imports. OPEN = manufactured 
exports + manufactured imports. LDCIMP = manufactured imports from developing countries (United Nations 
definition excluding the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China). IMPCHINA = 
manufactured imports from China. FIXCAP = gross domestic fixed capital formation.  
  TRADEBAL, OPEN, LDCIMP, IMPCHINA and FIXCAP are all expressed as percentages of GDP at current 
market prices. Exports are measured fob and imports are measured cif. In addition to country dummies (fixed 
effects) there are shift and adjustment dummies for Germany to allow for the effects of reunification.  These 
reunification dummies are equal to zero for t ≤ 1990; the shift dummy is equal to 1 for t >1990; the adjustment 
variable is equal to (t-1990)/6 for 1991 < t ≤ 1996 and to 1 thereafter. Equation (6) contains no constant or 
dummies apart from first differences of the German reunification dummies.  
 
Table 2 decomposes the changes in manufacturing employment into various components using the 
regression coefficients shown in equation (4). The headings in the table are self-explanatory with the 
exception of the component labelled ￿normal growth￿. This component covers all of the effects which 
would normally be associated with rising per capita income in a closed economy, and thus takes into 
account both the income elasticity of demand for manufactures and the influence of normal 
productivity and price changes. It is estimated from the coefficients of logY and (logY)
2  in equation 
(4). Note that this component excludes the effect of output and productivity changes due to 
international trade, in particular the abnormal productivity growth induced by competition from low-




Explaining de-industrialization, 1992￿2002 
 

























               
OECD 
Countries -4.0  -2.4  -0.2  -0.4 -3.0  -1.2  -0.2  0.5 
                
United States  -3.7  -4.1  0.6  0.0  -3.4  -1.6  -0.2  1.5 
European Union  -3.9  -1.6  -0.3 -0.9  -2.8  -0.9  -0.1 0.0 
Japan -5.1  -1.0  -1.8  0.0  -2.9  -1.1  -0.2  -0.9 
                
Republic of 
Korea -6.5  -1.3  -2.9  0.0  -4.2  -1.6  0.2  -0.8 
                
Taiwan Province 
of China  -3.2  -2.7 -1.0  0.0 -3.7  -2.4  -0.9 3.7 
 
Sources:   See table 1. 
Notes:   OECD refers to all the countries in our sample except for the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China. This table decomposes changes in the percentage share of manufacturing 
employment.  The estimates shown here are based on regression equation (4) in table 1. Normal 
growth is estimated from the income coefficients in equation (2); it includes the effects of the 
productivity and demand shifts that are normally associated with economic growth.  It excludes the 
structural changes due to trade with low wage countries.  These are included under the heading 
North-South trade. German restructuring refers to the loss of German manufacturing jobs due to 
restructuring following reunification. 
 
 
The main conclusion from our decomposition is that trade with low-wage economies has been a 
significant factor behind recent de-industrialization in many of the countries in our sample. However, 
in most cases it has been less important than internal factors such as productivity growth and shifting 
patterns of demand. In the sample as a whole, internal factors were about twice as important as North-
South trade in accounting for the relative decline of manufacturing employment since 1992. One 
interesting feature of the results is the unexplained positive residual in recent years for the United 
States, where the share of manufacturing employment has fallen by less than the predicted amount. 
The same is true of Canada and Italy, where the model fails to explain why the share of manufacturing 




From the estimates shown in table 1 it is possible to calculate the impact of North-South trade on the 
structure of employment in advanced economies. The answer depends on which equation is used. 
Suppose that manufactured exports to the South increase by 1 per cent of GDP. According to equation 
(4), which is arguably the most accurate, this will cause the share of manufacturing employment to rise 




of GDP, the result will be a 0.85 percentage point fall in the share of manufacturing jobs.
6 Thus, one 
dollar’s worth of imports from the South destroys 5.7 times as many Northern manufacturing jobs as 
are created by one dollar’s worth of exports to the South. The other equations in table 1 yield ratios of 
between 4.9 and 11.8. These estimates are all higher than the figure of 4.4 obtained in the earlier IMF 
study. The increase may reflect the recent growth of very cheap imports from China. These 
calculations reveal the origin of the ￿balanced trade effect￿, whereby imports from the South reduce 




Equation (4) implies that, amongst the richer countries in our sample, imports from the South have 
eliminated manufacturing jobs equivalent to between 1.5 per cent and 5 per cent of total employment 
over the past forty years. For the United States the figure is 3.0 per cent and for the average OECD 
country in our sample it is 2.3 per cent. The corresponding estimates for new manufacturing jobs 
created by exports to the South are 0.3 per cent and 0.4 per cent of total employment respectively. 
Given that total employment in the OECD countries in our sample is almost 400 million, this suggests 
that around 9 million manufacturing jobs have been lost because of Southern competition and around 
1.5 million created by additional exports to the South. If we restrict attention to the past decade, the 
imbalance between manufacturing jobs created and destroyed is even more striking. Equation (4) 
implies that, in the OECD countries in our sample, exports to the South created an extra 0.4 million 
manufacturing jobs over the period 1992￿2002. During the same period they eliminated 5.4 million 
manufacturing jobs giving a net loss of 5 million. This is not a huge figure compared to total 
employment of 400 million, but the impact on particular types of worker or on certain regions has 
been much greater than such a comparison would suggest.  
 
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM COMPARED 
 
The rest of this paper will focus mainly on the United States and the United Kingdom. These countries 
exhibit some important similarities. They are regarded as two of the more dynamic OECD economies 
and are often held up as models by those urging economic reform in Europe and Japan. In both 
countries, a widely praised economic performance has been accompanied by a prolonged and massive 
fall in the employment share of manufacturing. Both countries have experienced a prolonged decline 
in their manufacturing trade balance and in both of them this balance is now in deficit. There are also 
important differences. The United States has the world￿s strongest manufacturing sector, whereas 
manufacturing in the United Kingdom is in perennial difficulty. Although both countries now have a 
large deficit in their manufacturing trade, the significance of this deficit is different. The United States 
deficit is financed by borrowing abroad and is probably not sustainable over the long run. The United 
Kingdom deficit, on the other hand, is largely covered by income from overseas investments and by 
the rapidly growing earnings from knowledge-based services. Thus, although the United Kingdom has 
a much weaker manufacturing sector than the United States, its external position taken as a whole is 
stronger.  
 
                                                 
6These effects are derived as follows. An increase of 1 percentage point in the ratio of manufactured exports 
from the North to GDP implies a change of +1 unit in the variables TRADEBAL and OPEN. According to 
equation (4) in table 1, this will cause EMPSHARE to change by (0.257)(1) + (-0.106)(1) = 0.151 units. 
Conversely, suppose that the ratio of manufactured imports from the South to GDP increases by 1 percentage 
point. This will cause the variables TRADEBAL, OPEN and LDCIMP to alter by -1, +1 and +1 units 
respectively. From equation (4), it follows that EMPSHARE will change by (0.013)(-1) + (-0.095)(1) +   
(-0.976)(1) = -0.854. The balanced trade ratio in this case is equal to 0.854/0.151= 5.7. 








Chart 3 compares production in the United States and the United Kingdom. The output series in this 
chart are measured in constant prices at purchasing power parity. This gets rid of differences caused 
by inflation, fluctuating exchange rates and different price levels in the two countries. The series are 
our own estimates and they are inevitably rather crude. However, they are accurate enough for their 
present purpose.  
 
As can be seen from the chart, the per capita output of manufactures was similar thirty years ago in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. Productivity was much higher in the United States but this was 
largely offset by the fact that a much greater fraction of the British population was employed in the 
manufacturing sector. Since then manufacturing employment has fallen dramatically in the United 
Kingdom and the productivity gap between the two countries has got wider. As a result, the United 
States now produces roughly twice as many manufactured goods per head of population as the United 
Kingdom. The picture is much more favourable to the United Kingdom in the service sector. Per 
capita output of services is lower in the United Kingdom than in the United States, but the gap is 
relatively small and has been getting narrower in recent years. This strong performance reflects the 
contribution of new service exports that have helped to raise the overall growth rate of the United 
Kingdom service sector. 
Chart 3
Real output per head of population, 1960￿2003























































Sources: Current price value-added for 1995 was taken from the OECD National Accounts, Volume 2, 1981￿2001. The 
UK values were then converted to US$ 1995 using the following exchange rates: manufacturing $0.7=£1, services $0.58=£1. 
These exchange rates were chosen following inspection of the OECD purchasing power parities for various types of 
expenditure. Output series were then derived by extending the 1995 figures forwards and backwards using volume indices 
for real value-added.  
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The contrast between manufacturing in the two countries is further illustrated in chart 4 which shows 
what has happened to output and employment. The series in this chart are logarithmic indices which 
have been scaled for clarity.
8 The widening gap between the output and employment indices for each 
country is due to productivity growth, and the width of this gap indicates the cumulative increase in 
productivity since 1960.  
 
 
Over the period 1960￿2003 as a whole, productivity growth has been similar in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. It was faster in the United Kingdom during the earlier years and slower later on. 
Over most of the period, the absolute number of workers employed in United States manufacturing 
was roughly constant, and sustained productivity growth was matched by rising output. However, 
things were somewhat different during the recent recession. During this recession, manufacturing 
production stagnated whilst productivity growth continued at a fast pace, with the result that the 
absolute number of people employed in this sector fell sharply. This development partly reflects the 
impact of foreign competition on the Unites States manufacturing sector which has seen the loss of 
low-tech jobs to China and some high-tech jobs to India. It may also be partly a cyclical effect that 
will be reversed if the present output recovery is maintained. The picture is very different in the United 
Kingdom, where the manufacturing sector has experienced thirty years of almost stagnant output. 
Combined with rapid productivity growth this has led to a truly dramatic fall in employment. At its 
peak the United Kingdom manufacturing industry employed more than 8 million workers. Today the 
figure is around 4.5 million. The contrast between the two economies can be summarized as follows. 
Until the recent recession, productivity growth in United States manufacturing served mainly to 
increase output, whereas in the United Kingdom it served mainly to reduce employment. These 
                                                 
8 The indices shown in chart 4 are derived as follows.  Let Yi,t be the value of a certain variable (output or 
employment) in country i in year t. The logarithmic index yi,t is equal to  ) / log( 1960 , , i t i i Y Y A +  where AUK = 1 
and AUS = 2.  
Chart 4
















Sources: Employment from OECD Labour Office Statistics ; output estimated from National Accounts  data on real value-added and 
OECD purchasing power parities. 
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statements refer, of course, to aggregates. The comparative stability of aggregate employment in 
United States manufacturing conceals the fact that some industries in this sector lost workers whilst 
others gained workers. Likewise, the near stagnation of manufacturing output in the United Kingdom 
conceals the fact that output fell in some industries and increased in others. However, this does not 




By definition, the manufacturing trade balance is equal to national production of manufactured goods 
minus national expenditure on such goods. Charts 5 and 6 show what has happened to these items in 
the United Kingdom and the United States. In both of these countries expenditure on manufactures has 
outstripped national production, with the result that both of them have a growing deficit in their trade 
balance in manufactures. The production of manufactures has grown much faster in the United States, 
































Sources: Production from Office for National Staistics (ONS), index of industrial production; exports and imports from 
ONS, trade volumes, SITC categories; expenditure = production + imports ￿ exports.  Benchmark production and 
expenditure balance from ONS Supply and Use Tables 1995.



































Sources:  Production from the Bureau of Labour Statistics, exports and imports estimated from Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
National Accounts; expenditure = production + imports ￿ exports.  Benchmark production and expenditure balance from 1996 USA 
Input-Output Tables, Bureau of Economic analysis. 
Note:  See chart 5. 
 
Further information on manufacturing trade is given in charts 7 and 8, which compare the United 
Kingdom and the United States with other developed economies. Taken as a whole, the manufacturing 
trade balance of the developed economies has been gradually deteriorating. However, this 
phenomenon is entirely accounted for by the United States and the United Kingdom. For the past forty 
years, despite occasional fluctuations, the manufacturing trade balance of other developed economies 
has remained roughly flat when expressed as a percentage of GDP.  
 
Provided that some other source of revenue can be found, a worsening in the manufacturing trade 
balance is not important.
9 What matters is the overall balance of payments, which in addition to 
manufactures includes all current expenditures and receipts for such items as food, materials, fuel, 
services, transfers, and property income. Any loss of net revenue in manufacturing trade can in 
principle be made good by additional net revenue from these other items. Indeed, this is just what has 
happened in the case of the United Kingdom. New sources of overseas income have been developed 
and net imports of such items as food and raw materials have fallen dramatically as a share of GDP.  
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Source:  UNCTAD database.
 Chart 8
 Manufacturing trade balances of "Other developed" countries




























Source:  UNCTAD database. 
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As a result, despite a massive deterioration in manufacturing trade, the United Kingdom overall 
balance of payments is in moderately good shape. In contrast, the United States has not yet developed 
new sources of income to offset its worsening trade balance in manufactures. As a result the country 
now has a large current account deficit. Such a situation is not sustainable over the long run, and 
sooner or later the gap between expenditures and receipts will have to be reduced. This may come 
about spontaneously through a devaluation of the United States dollar such as we are currently 
witnessing. Or it may come about because China and other developing countries open their markets to 
United States exports and allow United States firms to earn more foreign exchange. The contrast 
between the United Kingdom and the United States is illustrated in chart 9. In 2003, the United 
Kingdom had a current account deficit equal to 1.5 per cent of GDP, whereas the United States figure 




Current account of the balance of payments: 






































It is interesting to note that the superior balance of payments performance of the United Kingdom has 
been accompanied by a strong overall economic performance. National output and employment grew 
almost as fast in the United Kingdom during the 1990s as in the United States, and overall productivity 
growth was almost identical in the two countries (table 3). The performance of the United Kingdom 
manufacturing industry was poor, but this was offset by a strong performance in services. Indeed, on a 
per capita basis the United Kingdom grew significantly faster than the United States over the decade 
as a whole. 
 
IV. FOCUS ON THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The preceding discussion indicates how the United Kingdom has prospered and maintained a 
moderately sound balance of payments despite a weak manufacturing sector and a weak 
manufacturing trade performance. This is an unusual combination that is worth exploring in more 
depth. To round off the paper we shall therefore examine the country￿s balance of payments in more 
detail. 
 
The United Kingdom emerged from the Second World War in a difficult economic situation. Much of 
its overseas wealth had been lost in the war and revenue from this source was severely depleted. The 
price of imported food and raw materials was astronomical, and a huge manufacturing trade surplus 
was required to pay for vital imports. In 1950, the United Kingdom manufacturing trade surplus was 
11 per cent of GDP ￿ more than three times its pre-war level, but even this was not sufficient to cover 
the even larger deficit on other items such as food and materials. The United Kingdom was still one of 
the great industrial nations of the world, but its situation seemed precarious. Moreover, international 
Table 3 
United States and United Kingdom compared, 1990￿2000 
Per cent change per annum 
United States  United Kingdom 
Real domestic expenditure 
  Goods and services  3.5  3.2 
  Manufactures  5.4  2.7 
Domestic production 
  Goods and services  3.2  2.9 
  Manufactures  3.4  0.6 
Employment 
  Goods and services  1.2  1.0 
  Manufactures  -0.2  -2.1 
Population  1.2 0.3 
Output per employed person 
  Goods and services  2.0  1.9 
  Manufactures  3.6  2.7 
Output per head of population 
  Goods and services  2.0  2.6 
  Manufactures  2.2  0.3 
Sources: Total expenditure and total output of goods and services from the United States and the United Kingdom National 
Accounts data; total employment and population for both countries and manufacturing employment for the United 
Kingdom from OECD Labour Force Statistics; manufacturing output and employment for the United States from 
the Bureau of Labour Statistics; manufacturing expenditure estimated (see charts 5 and 6). 
Notes: Domestic expenditure = personal consumption + investment + government consumption (C + I + G).  Domestic
production  = GDP.  Employment includes self-employment and government employees.   
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competition was about to intensify as the war-torn economies of Continental Europe recovered and 
new competitors appeared in Asia.  
 
In the event, things turned out quite well. The United Kingdom economy grew quite fast by its own 
historical standards, living standards rose, and the country did not go bankrupt. Even so, there was 
nagging unease as the country experienced periodic currency crises and its manufacturing trade 
surplus steadily shrank. Following a seminal article by Ajit Singh (1977), there was an intense debate, 
about why the manufacturing trade surplus had been shrinking and what this trend signified. Some saw 
it as a pathological development that could only end in disaster. Others, such as Rowthorn and Wells 
(1987), argued that it reflected long-run structural changes that were altering the shape of the United 
Kingdom economy and its relations with the rest of the world.
10 In the immediate post-war period, the 
country had needed a huge manufacturing trade surplus because there was no other way to pay for its 
large and expensive imports of food and raw materials. Now the United Kingdom was less reliant on 
these items and their real price had fallen dramatically. Moreover, there were new sources of revenue, 
such North Sea Oil, services and income from overseas investments, which could be used to pay for 
imported food and raw materials. As a result, the United Kingdom￿s previously huge deficit on non-
manufacturing trade had disappeared and hence there was no longer the need to finance this deficit by 
earning a huge surplus on manufacturing trade.  
 
This view is now widely accepted. The United Kingdom manufacturing trade is now in deficit and no 
one seems to be very worried about it. This is partly because the importance of service exports is now 
widely recognized. It is also because the growth of international capital markets has made it much 
easier to borrow money and finance deficits than used to be case. Moreover, having shrunk to only 
one-seventh of direct employment, manufacturing has now lost its former hold on the public 
imagination. Although few would write off manufacturing completely, many now believe it to be of 
secondary importance compared to knowledge-based services such as finance or consultancy. This, in 
our view, is a mistake. Rowthorn and Wells were right to argue that the United Kingdom economy had 
become overspecialized by 1950, and that a substantial reorientation away from manufacturing 
towards other activities was inevitable. However, things may have gone too far. Too much 
manufacturing capacity may have been shed, and the failure to develop a more dynamic 
manufacturing sector may eventually turn out to have serious consequences for the balance of 
payments and the overall prosperity of the country.  Having been over-specialized in one direction, the 
United Kingdom may be in danger of becoming over-specialized in another. As the example of the 
United States shows, it is wrong to believe that manufacturing belongs in the past and is no longer 
important in a modern economy.  
 
The balance of payments 
 
The overall payments position of a country is normally measured by the so-called current account. In 
addition to manufactured goods, this account includes ￿other visibles￿, such as food, fuels and raw 
materials, together with ￿invisibles￿, such as services, income from overseas investments, migrants￿ 
remittances and inter-governmental transfers. Chart 10 gives a breakdown of the United Kingdom 
current account into these three major components. After the turbulence associated with the oil crises 
of the 1970s and their aftermath, the overall picture is now one of comparative stability. Even so,
                                                 
10 See Rowthorn and Wells (1987).  
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recent years do exhibit some kind of pattern. The trade balance on ￿other invisibles￿ has been very 
small and stable over the past decade, due to the fact that the United Kingdom is now self-sufficient in 
oil, and that food and raw material imports are nowadays of secondary importance. Meanwhile, the 
deficit in manufacturing trade has been getting worse, but this has been offset by improvements on the 
invisible side of the account. 
 
 
The overall improvement in invisibles conceals some widely divergent trends. As can be seen from 
chart 11, there is a large and growing deficit in transfers and traditional services such as transport and 
travel. The main factor behind this trend, as shown in table 4, has been an explosion in foreign travel 
by British tourists, driven by a combination of rising incomes, a strong pound and cheap travel. On the 
other hand, there has been a dramatic growth in receipts from knowledge-based services, such as 
banking, finance, consultancy and other business services. Within the space of a decade, earnings from 
this source have more than doubled their share of GDP. There has also been a rapid growth in income 
from overseas investments. As table 4 shows, this growth is mainly due to large increases in portfolio 
income and the retained earnings of the overseas subsidiaries of the United Kingdom companies. It is 
conventional to include all retained earnings as a credit item in the balance of payments. Wynne 
Godley (2003) has criticized this practice on the grounds that it exaggerates both the level and growth 
of what can legitimately be regarded as United Kingdom investment income.
11 In 2003, overseas 
investments and knowledge-based services between them generated a net income for the United 
Kingdom equal to nearly 6 per cent of GDP.  
 
                                                 
11 Some of the retained earnings of overseas subsidiaries belong indirectly to overseas shareholders in the United 
Kingdom parent companies. This portion of retained earnings should really be classified as income for the 
countries in which these shareholders reside. Conversely, part of the retained earnings of foreign subsidiaries 
operating in the United Kingdom should be recorded as a credit item for the United Kingdom, since British 
residents hold shares in their foreign parent companies. The net effect of this convention is to exaggerate the 
level and growth of the United Kingdom surplus on the overseas income account.  
Chart 10



































































Traditional services and transfers
Source:  United Kingdom  Balance of Payments (Pink Book).
Chart 12




























Traditional services and tansfers





Components of services and property income in the United Kingdom balance of payments 
 
           £ million         Per cent of GDP  Balances 
1990 2003  1990  2003  Change 
 
Knowledge-based services  7397  31854  1.5  3.3  1.8 
of which:         
     Insurance*  585  5846  0.1  0.6  0.5 
     Financial services  3333  9967  0.7  1.0  0.3 
     Other business services*  3520  14006  0.7  1.4  0.7 
     Computers and information*  301  2395  0.1  0.3  0.2 
     Other services*  13  1261  0  0.1  0.1 
          
Traditional services and transfers  -7992 -32189  -1.6 -3.3  -1.7 
of which:          
     Transport  -706  -5255  -0.1  -0.5  -0.4 
     Travel  -1565  -15770  -0.3  -1.6  -1.3 
     Government  -789  -740  -0.2  -0.1  0.1 
     Transfers  -4932  -10423  -1.0  -1.1  -0.1 
          
Income -2979  23215  -0.6  2.4  3.0 
of which:         
     Retained earnings  8328  31807  1.7  3.3  1.6 
     Dividends and other income  -11307  -8422  -2.3  -0.9  1.4 
 
Source:  United Kingdom Balance of Payments (Pink Book). 
           *   Data from 1991. 
 
 
For comparison, chart 12 provides information about the major invisible items in the United States 
balance of payments. The most striking feature is how small these items are in relation to GDP and 
how little they have altered. Whereas the United Kingdom has experienced rapid growth in its net 
income from knowledge-based services and overseas investments, these items have either stagnated or 
declined in the United States in recent years. In the case of transfers and traditional services, the 
balance is deteriorating in both countries, but the deficit is much larger in the United Kingdom and the 
pace of decline is much faster. These contrasts indicate how much restructuring there has been in the 
United Kingdom external balance and how little there has been in the United States. 
 
Strong and weak industries in United Kingdom manufacturing 
 
Chart 13 classifies manufacturing industries into three groups according to their trade performance: 
weaker, competitive, and strongly competitive. Weaker industries are defined as those that have a 
negative and worsening trade balance; strongly competitive industries have a positive and improving 
trade balance, and the rest are classified as competitive. The list of strongly competitive industries is 
small and comprises chemicals and pharmaceuticals, machinery and equipment, and other transport 
(aerospace and weapons); and the rest are classified as competitive. The list of weaker industries is 
large and includes such obvious ones as clothing or leather where domestic producers are suffering 
severe competition from low wage imports. It also includes less obvious ones such as office equipment 







In most manufacturing industries, imports and exports are increasing simultaneously, both absolutely 
and in relation to national production. In the strongest sectors, such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
or other transport, exports exceed imports and the balance is stable or improving. In weaker industries, 
the opposite is true. In some cases, total exports are increasing, but they are being outstripped by 
mushrooming imports. This is most obvious in office equipment and computers, where exports rose by 
80 per cent between 1995 and 2001, but imports grew by 270 per cent. The picture is similar, but less 
dramatic in wood, paper and printing, vehicles and the residual group ￿other manufacturing￿. The fact 
that exports are increasing in such supposedly weak industries indicates that they still retain some 
areas of strength. This is confirmed by the fact that, in most of the weaker industries just listed, 
national production has been increasing. This should make us cautious about writing off such 
industries simply because their trade balance is negative and getting worse. However, there are a few 
manufacturing industries, such as textiles, leather and clothing, or basic metals, where both exports 
and production are falling. This is evidence of long-term decline, although even in these industries 
there must be areas of actual or potential strength, and they should not be written off prematurely. 
 
Chart 13























































Prediction is always hazardous. About a decade or more ago, a group of us in Cambridge made a study 
of the United Kingdom balance of payments and explored various scenarios for the future.
12 We 
predicted fairly accurately the deterioration in the manufacturing trade balance, but it is now clear that 
we were too pessimistic about prospects for invisible earnings, above all income from overseas 
investments. As a result, our predictions for the overall balance of payments were unduly negative. 
After this experience, we are a bit reluctant to make predictions. Anything we shall now say, therefore, 
comes with a health warning. 
 
An area where prediction is particularly difficult is the balance of payments. This balance is the 
difference between two very large quantities (exports and imports) and quite small proportionate 
changes in these items can cause the balance to swing sharply from surplus to deficit or vice versa. 
However, it is fair to say that the present balance of payments situation is a cause for modest concern. 
The current account deficit is now around 2 per cent of GDP.  In itself, this is not a very large figure 
and could be financed for some years by international borrowing. Of more concern is the danger that 
things may get worse. We have identified certain areas where trade performance is deteriorating, such 
as the weaker manufacturing industries and traditional services ￿ especially tourism. Moreover, the 
production of North Sea Oil has reached a plateau and is expected to begin a long-term decline.
13 To 
offset continued decline in these areas will require continued improvement in other sectors, such as 
knowledge-based services, income from overseas investment, or the more competitive manufacturing 
industries. Such improvements cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, in some cases there could easily 
be a reversal of fortune. For example, income from overseas investments is a volatile item which, 
historically, has swung several times from deficit to surplus and back again. It is not clear that such 
oscillations have come to an end, and the present surplus could unexpectedly shrink or disappear 
altogether. Moreover, as mentioned above, this surplus is already smaller than it appears because it is 
inflated by misleading accounting conventions. The trade surplus on knowledge-based services looks 
set to continue rising, but this may not be large enough to compensate for serious failings elsewhere in 
the balance of payments.  
 
Thus, although the present deficit is not a cause for immediate alarm, there are some worrying features 
in the balance of payments. The situation is precarious and could easily get much worse. The ideal 
would be to eliminate the present current account deficit altogether, but short of this ideal it would still 
be a valuable achievement to stabilize the balance of payments and prevent a further worsening of our 
trade performance. This may be difficult to achieve without some revival in the fortunes of the 
manufacturing sector. Manufacturing still accounts for almost 60 per cent of the United Kingdom total 
exports of goods and services. Manufactured exports are 5 times larger than total earnings from the 
export of all knowledge-based services combined. Knowledge-based services are a vital and dynamic 
component of our exports, but they cannot be expected to compensate for widespread failings in the 
manufacturing sector. For the foreseeable future, manufactures will continue to play an important role 
in our foreign trade, and the health of our balance of payments will in large measure depend on what 
happens to manufacturing. For reasons of economic security, and regional balance, the United 
Kingdom needs a stronger manufacturing sector. How this might be achieved is a subject for another 
paper. 
 
                                                 
12 Coutts and Godley (1990), Cosh, Hughes and Rowthorn (1994) and Cosh, Coutts and  Hughes (1996). 





This paper has revisited the long-standing debate on the links between foreign trade and de-
industrialization. The bulk of the paper offers an empirical breakdown of the forces behind de-
industrialization in advanced industrial economies, including some of the East Asian newly 
industrializing economies whose evolving employment pattern confirms previous findings, such as 
productivity growth and shifting patterns of demand, that internal forces have been driving this 
process. However, the analysis does have broader relevance for policy makers, including in 
developing countries. In the first place, this research confirms that balance of payments analysis 
remains of relevance to the adjustment challenges of a more interdependent global economy. The 
tendency to downplay this constraint has been costly for many developing countries. Secondly, the 
fact that North-South trade cannot be ignored in the debate on de-industrialization haunts the debate 
on how to better manage a more integrated global economy. The paper estimates that 5 million 
manufacturing jobs have been lost to exports in the South over the 10 years between 1992 and 2002.  
This is not a huge figure compared to total employment of 400 million. Moreover, these numbers are 
not big by historical standards and they suggest that policies other than those linked to trade matter 
much more in creating jobs. This is clearly confirmed by job creation in the United States in the 1990s 
against the backdrop of a deteriorating balance of trade and by Taiwan Province of China which 
experienced the largest hit from North-South trade in the 1990s, without provoking the kind of outcry 
seen elsewhere. Finally, manufacturing still matters to economic performance even at the highest 
levels of economic development. Recent evidence showing premature de-industrialization in Latin 
America points to serious mismanagement of their closer integration into the global economy since the 
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